Truth - Philosophy

Trechos do texto da minha defesa de proposta

In the Big Data era, the Veracity aspect explores data's consistency, accuracy, quality, and trustworthiness. Users must decide what is relevant or not, what is reliable, and which source of information they trust to consider the information accurate and helpful in carrying out the task he has in mind.

[Professor Hermann comenta sobre modelos de reputação existentes] 

But what do we mean by context? For this research, we adopted the general context definition from [Hogan et al., 2021]: “By context, we herein refer to the scope of truth, and thus talk about the context in which some data are held to be true”.

[Professor Hermann indica uma referência sobre Truth da SEP]

Glanzberg, Michael, "Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/truth/>. 

Information can be recorded through claims that represent what can be asserted about the world, whether true or false. The definition of truth depends on claims’ context and tasks where the information will be employed. A claim can be considered true if its logical, rational, or empirical justification is accepted by a relevant community who will act based on it, since there is no absolute truth.

The post-truth phenomena and the current spread of "fake news" or disinformation show that truth depends on what is accepted by a community.

[Professor Hermann comenta que relevante não é aplicável aqui. A comunidade de Terra Planismo se acha relevante e fizeram até uma conferência. A Verdade e a verdade para a Ciência não são sinônimos e nem coextensionais, ou seja, não compartilham as mesmas características e limites.]

Trechos de Truth na Enciclopédia de Filosofia

According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. ... Propositions are what are believed, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, and a belief in that proposition is correct. ... Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propositions.

[Verdade intrínseca. Relação entre a proposição e o Mundo Real]

[Usamos alegações (proposições) e não fatos justamente para dar suporte a definição de DOWA] 

The correspondence theory of truth is at its core an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity – a fact – to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief is false.

[Podemos acreditar em algo falso mas nunca conhecer algo falso]

The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs. ... Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory of truth.

[Para ser verdadeiro, para ser conhecimento, deve ser justificável] 

Truth is the end of inquiry.

Truth is satisfactory to believe.  

... pragmatists’ views on truth also make room for the idea that truth involves a kind of correspondence, insofar as the scientific method of inquiry is answerable to some independent world. ... an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. 

[Na visão pragmática, verdade deve ser verificável] 

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth (1935) is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his (1931), and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory – a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth.

[Verdade do ponto de vista lógico-matemático não é o mesmo que o filosófico]

But it should be stressed that for this discussion, sentences are fully interpreted sentences, having meanings. We will also assume that the sentences in question do not change their content across occasions of use, i.e., that they display no context-dependence. We are taking sentences to be what Quine (1960) calls ‘eternal sentences’. In some places (e.g., Tarski, 1944), Tarski refers to his view as the ‘semantic conception of truth’. It is not entirely clear just what Tarski had in mind by this, but it is clear enough that Tarski’s theory defines truth for sentences in terms of concepts like reference and satisfaction, which are intimately related to the basic semantic functions of names and predicates (according to many approaches to semantics).

[As sentenças (formuladas como alegações em linguagem natural?) seriam independentes de contexto para avaliar a verdade. Do contexto onde foram enunciadas ou do contexto do que enunciam?]

The key features of realism, as we will take it, are that:

1. The world exists objectively, independently of the ways we think about it or describe it.
2. Our thoughts and claims are about that world.

[Partes do mundo só existem em relação ao que pensamos como por exemplo Valores Morais. Nossos pensamentos seguem a nossa perspectiva/visão de mundo. A camada de regras de decisão seriam quem enxerga o mundo e pode avaliar se é Verdade ou Mentira]

we might expect the characteristic mark of anti-realism to be the rejection of bivalence. Indeed, many contemporary forms of anti-realism may be formulated as theories of truth, and they do typically deny bivalence. ... a claim is correct just insofar as it is in principle verifiable, i.e., there is a verification procedure we could in principle carry out which would yield the answer that the claim in question was verified.

So understood, verificationism is a theory of truth. The claim is not that verification is the most important epistemic notion, but that truth just is verifiability. As with the kind of realism we considered in section 4.1, this view expresses its metaphysical commitments in its explanation of the nature of truth. Truth is not, to this view, a fully objective matter, independent of us or our thoughts. Instead, truth is constrained by our abilities to verify, and is thus constrained by our epistemic situation. Truth is to a significant degree an epistemic matter, which is typical of many anti-realist positions.

[Anti-realismo seria dogmático, não aceita a possibilidade de ser falso/mentira. Só existe aquela Verdade.]

Such a proposal might suggest there are multiple concepts of truth, or that the term ‘true’ is itself ambiguous. However, whether or not a pluralist view is committed to such claims has been disputed. In particular, Lynch (2001b; 2009) develops a version of pluralism which takes truth to be a functional role concept. The functional role of truth is characterized by a range of principles that articulate such features of truth as its objectivity, its role in inquiry, and related ideas we have encountered in considering various theories of truth. ... Lynch suggests that for ordinary claims about material objects, truth might be realized by a correspondence property (which he links to representational views), while for moral claims truth might be manifest by an assertibility property along more anti-realist lines.

[A avaliação de Verdade depende do tipo de informação (conhecimento). Alegações sobre objetos concretos ou abstratos. Aqui já entra o comentário do Hermann pore-mail]

{Pelo que me lembro do nosso papo, as diferenças entre o tipo de conhecimento que discutimos foram mais no tocante a forma de validação.  Tem mais a ver com se o conheciemnto é analítico ou sintético. No caso a matemática tem por validação as provas  e as refutações. O conceito de prova em uma teoria matemática é rígido.  Enquanto em teoria científica temos falsos positivos, positivos verdadeiros, falsos negativos e negativos, em uma teoria matemática não temos falsos negativos. Uma prova errada é nada, não é evidência para nada, enquanto um experimento válido que tende a refutar uma teoria cientĩfica é uma evidência contrária a teoria. O mesmo pode ser levado para a lei quando tomada como o código (Lex Códex , ou the Law). Sobe o ponto de vista da Common Law,  aquela praticada na inglaterra e  EUAs, é outra coisa. Cada julgamento, quase sempre determinado pelo júri, fornece uma evidência formal para a "verdade" de enunciado legal. Enfim a natureza do conhecimento é determinada pela natureza dos mecanismos de validação ou verificação da correspondência com a verdade (note que isso não é a verdade propriamente dita). }

There have been many debates in the literature over what the primary bearers of truth are. Candidates typically include beliefs, propositions, sentences, and utterances.  ... Truth-bearers are things which meaningfully make claims about what the world is like, and are true or false depending on whether the facts in the world are as described.

[E as informações sobre o contexto onde as sentenças e alegações são formuladas?]

They characterize the world as being some way or another, and this in turn determines whether they are true or false. Indeed, Tarski needs there to be a fact of the matter about whether each sentence is true or false (abstracting away from context dependence), to ensure that the Tarski biconditionals do their job of fixing the extension of ‘is true’.

[O valor de Verdeadeiro ou Falso não dependeria de contexto]

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful.

{neo clássica}... how propositions are meaningful. They are so in virtue of having constituents in the world, which are brought together in the right way. There are many complications about the nature of meaning, but at a minimum, this tells us what the truth conditions associated with a proposition are. The theory then explains how such truth conditions can lead to the truth value true, by the right fact existing. Many theories of truth are like the neo-classical correspondence theory in being as much theories of how truth-bearers are meaningful as of how their truth values are fixed. Again, abstracting from some complications about meaning, this makes them theories both of truth conditions and truth values. 

{tarski} ... But they also show us the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by these semantic properties. For instance, for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, the theory tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’. This can be understood as telling us that the truth conditions of ‘Snow is white’ are those conditions in which the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’.

Em relação a Truth pedi ao ChatGPT que explicasse sobre as teorias

Theories of truth in philosophy attempt to understand the nature and definition of truth itself. Over the centuries, philosophers have proposed various theories in an effort to explain what it means for a statement or belief to be true. Here are some prominent theories of truth:

1. Correspondence Theory: This theory suggests that truth is a correspondence between a statement or belief and the facts of the world. According to this view, a statement is true if it accurately describes or corresponds to the way things are in reality.

2. Coherence Theory: The coherence theory of truth emphasizes the internal consistency and logical coherence of a set of beliefs. According to this view, a statement is considered true if it fits within a larger system of beliefs without contradiction.

3. Pragmatic Theory: The pragmatic theory of truth focuses on the practical consequences or utility of a belief. According to this view, a statement is true if it works or is useful in achieving desired goals or outcomes.

4. Deflationary Theory: This theory suggests that truth is a concept that can be deflated or reduced to a trivial statement. It argues that the concept of truth adds no substantive meaning beyond simply affirming the statement itself.

5. Constructivist Theory: Constructivism holds that truth is constructed or created by human minds. According to this view, truth is not discovered but rather a product of social, cultural, or individual processes.

6. Consensus Theory: This theory suggests that truth is determined by a consensus or agreement among a group of people. It emphasizes the social aspect of truth and argues that truth is established through communal acceptance or shared understanding.

It's important to note that these theories are not mutually exclusive, and different philosophers may combine elements from multiple theories or propose their own unique perspectives on truth. Additionally, debates about the nature of truth continue to evolve within philosophical discourse, with new ideas and theories emerging over time.

[As teorias dos itens 3,5 e 6 estão alinhadas com o problema que estamos tratando. A teoria 1 não atenderia pq a camada de decisão não se aplicaria.]

The Correspondence Theory and Neo-Classical Correspondence Theory focus on the relationship between statements and facts. The Coherence Theory emphasizes the coherence and logical consistency among beliefs. Pragmatist theories emphasize the practical consequences and utility of beliefs.

[No caso da Busca Exploratória a teoria Pragmatista estaria mais adequada uma vez que existe uma necessidade de informação que motivou a busca e esta necessidade teria condições para ser satisfeita. No sentido da utilidade da informação recuperada, além da camada de decisão estabelecer o que é verdade, também é definido ser é útil e aplicável ao "problema" que se deseja resolver, tarefa que se deseja executar]

The nature of knowledge is not solely determined by the nature of validation checks or verification of correspondence with truth, but these factors do play a significant role in understanding and establishing knowledge. Let's explore this further:

1. Nature of Validation Checks: Validation checks or methods used to assess the validity or truthfulness of knowledge claims are an important aspect of determining the reliability and accuracy of knowledge. Different fields and disciplines employ various validation methods, such as empirical observation, experimentation, logical reasoning, peer review, or consensus-building processes. These validation checks help to evaluate the evidence, reasoning, and coherence supporting a claim, contributing to the overall assessment of knowledge.

2. Correspondence with Truth: Correspondence with truth is a crucial criterion for assessing the reliability and truthfulness of knowledge claims. The correspondence theory of truth, for instance, suggests that a belief or proposition is true if it accurately corresponds to the facts of the world. Verification or validation processes often aim to establish or confirm this correspondence by seeking evidence, empirical data, logical consistency, or other means of assessing the truth value of a claim.

[No caso de tipos de conhecimento x como verificar / validar para chegar a Verdade, isto irá depender das regras que estão na camada de decisão bem como do modelo de crenças usuário que está realizando a exploração. O CKG irá fornecer as informações de modo mais contextualizado possível, indicando inclusive os contextos implícitos ou que estão incompletos.]